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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The participants in the [New Jersey] procedure [for compulsory 
medication] are mental health professionals, rather than judges 
who have doffed their black robes and donned white coats. 
Rennie v. Klein1 
 
 *  Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of 
Law.  The author is grateful for the criticisms and suggestions offered, in response to an earlier draft 
of this article, by Professors Michael Saks, Joseph Sanders, Michael Risinger, Gary Edmond, 
Edward Cheng, and Andrew Jurs; all errors, of course, remain the responsibility of the author. 
 1. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). 
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Judge Alex Kozinski . . . interpreted Daubert as creating a brave 
new world in which trial court judges donned white coats and were 
forced to play scientist. 
David L. Faigman & John Monahan 2 
In the ongoing discourse concerning admissibility of scientific expertise 
in the courtroom, the question of whether post-Daubert trial judges should 
become “amateur” scientists3 (no one is suggesting an abdication of the 
judicial role4) is meant to raise concerns about the capacity of judges to 
make scientific judgments.  My focus is on another apparent trend at the 
intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and 
professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical 
responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its 
reliability.  In terms of the extant clothing metaphors, lawyers are now 
seemingly asked to don both black robes and white lab coats.5 
My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling 
implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has 
obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but 
are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability 
determinations.6  I take seriously Judge Kozinski’s concern, in Daubert on 
remand, that “scientists often have  vigorous and sincere disagreements as to 
what research methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient 
proof for the existence of a ‘fact,’ and whether information derived by a 
particular method can tell us anything useful about the subject under study.”7 
The fact that judges, typically untrained in science, need to “resolve 
disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters 
squarely within their expertise,”8 a “daunting task,”9 seems to suggest that 
lawyers could too.  But judges do not always agree on the admissibility of 
 2. David L. Faigman & John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law’s 
Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 631, 636 (2005). 
 3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not impose on judges “either the 
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists”). 
 4. Indeed, it was Frye-regime judges who might have been thought to abdicate judicial decision 
making to technical experts, but not post-Daubert, gatekeeping judges.  See Faigman & Monahan, 
supra note 2, at 636 (suggesting that the Frye test, namely “whether the field accepted the proffered 
knowledge,” was more deferential to scientists than the Daubert test, whereby “judges have brought 
greater scrutiny to bear on proffered expertise”).  
 5. See infra notes 12–20 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 7.  
 7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1315. 
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expertise, and discerning reliability has proved to be controversial.10  To 
expect attorneys—and this is what the proponents of a duty to vet experts 
expect—to do sufficient scientific research to create their own reliability 
controversy, make a determination as to the ultimate reliability of their own 
experts, and face ethical sanctions if they err is going too far.  While it is 
easy to choose examples that support a compelling argument for a 
responsibility to vet experts, the complexity of the scientific enterprise, in 
terms of its diverse methodologies, probabilistic conclusions, and genuine 
scientific disagreements, counsels against a broad, new ethical duty.  Indeed, 
some of the arguments for that new duty seem to rest on unrealistic 
assumptions about science and the ease with which reliability determinations 
can be made.  Moreover, a broad duty to vet experts would represent a 
serious and problematic departure from the lawyer’s role as an advocate. 
At the outset, however, I should acknowledge that the notion of 
imposing a duty to vet experts has tremendous appeal and seems to rest on 
the convergence of three other trends or phenomena.11  First, concerns over 
prosecutorial misuse of expert testimony are growing and easily justified: 
Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the 
DNA exonerations . . . in the 1990s concern the misconduct of 
prosecutors.  In Actual Innocence, [which examined] sixty-two . . . 
DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law School’s 
Innocence Project[, a] . . . significant contributor to these 
miscarriages of justice was the misuse of expert testimony.  A third 
of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science” . . . . 
 The prosecutorial misconduct revealed in the exoneration cases, 
however, is not a new phenomenon . . . [which suggests] that the 
 10. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF 
SCIENCE IN LAW 15–47 (2006) (offering examples of trial judges whose reliability determinations 
were reversed on appeal); Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of 
Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6–7 (2009). 
The Daubert ruling is far from unambiguous . . . and its articulation of the idea of 
evidentiary reliability is far from transparent . . . .  The Joiner ruling . . . creates further 
concerns about the blurring of questions of admissibility with questions of the weight or 
the sufficiency of evidence; the Kumho Tire ruling finally acknowledges that what really 
matters is . . . whether [expert testimony, scientific or otherwise,] is reliable—yet it seems 
to leave the tricky stuff to courts’ discretion.  And the revised [Federal] Rule [of 
Evidence] 702, with its emphatic repetition of “reliable,” “reliably,” and “sufficient,” is 
apt to leave one doubtful whether any verbal formula, by itself, could make it possible to 
determine whether the data on which a scientific witness bases his opinion are sufficient, 
or whether his methods are reliable.  
Id. 
 11. See infra notes 12–20 and accompanying text. 
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problem is systemic rather than episodic.12 
Giannelli and McMunigal provide ample support for, and frightening 
examples of, that proposition.13  They conclude that a gatekeeping role for 
prosecutors should be added to ABA Model Rule 3.8, requiring, as a 
precondition to offering scientific evidence, a “good faith and reasonable 
belief that the evidence (1) is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) is the product of reliable 
application of such principles and methods to the facts of the case.”14  That 
is, the prosecutor should perform, in advance, the admissibility 
determination typically performed by a trial judge in a Daubert hearing.   
Second, and closely related to the concerns over prosecutors’ use of 
unreliable forensic science, there is a growing concern that the “existing 
rules of admissibility, judicial discretions, jury directions, limitations placed 
on the use of evidence, and the availability of review have not been used in 
ways that might have prevented serious and continuing problems.”15  In his 
appeal to Canadian courts to develop a strong Daubert-type standard, the 
problems that Gary Edmond had in mind are related to prosecutors’ use of 
evidence based in forensic science and medicine, fields “historically 
insulated from more mainstream scientific and biomedical research;” this 
suggests the need for “an explicit reliability standard [to be imposed] on 
expert evidence adduced by the state.”16 
The basic contention is that courts should not admit expert evidence 
adduced by the prosecution unless there are good grounds for 
believing that the evidence is reliable.  Expressed more precisely, 
judges should [require] that evidence is demonstrably reliable . . . .  
In practice, the state would be expected to undertake some kind of 
empirical testing to ascertain whether the techniques and theories 
relied on by forensic scientists, pathologists, and technicians are 
valid and accurate.17 
Because courts throughout the common-law jurisdictions do not seem to 
 12. Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1493–94 (2007) (citing BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000)).  
 13. See Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 1495–1513. 
 14. Id. at 1535–36 (referring to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007)).  The 
proposed addition to Model Rule 3.8 tracks the prerequisites for admissibility in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.  Id. 
 15. See Gary Edmond, Pathological Science? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert Forensic 
Pathology Evidence, at 17, available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/ 
policy_research/pdf/Edmond_Paper.pdf (published in PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY AND THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 96–149 (K. Roach ed., 2008)); see also Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 
1531–32. 
 16. See Edmond, supra note 15, at 1, 3. 
 17. Id. at 1–2. 
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“have subjected institutionalized forensic science and medicine to 
particularly stringent tests of accountability,” and even though the U.S. 
federal courts’ “Daubert criteria provide neither an accurate (or even 
coherent) characterization of science, medicine, and expertise, nor an 
especially neat solution to issues of reliability” for “impecunious [criminal] 
defendants (or plaintiffs),” an onerous application of “all four of the Daubert 
criteria” would “seem to be a reasonable requisite for [prosecutorial use of] 
forensic science and medical evidence.”18  Although Edmond does not 
recommend a higher ethical standard for Canadian prosecutors (or other 
attorneys), his proposal for reform places additional responsibilities on 
prosecutors to test the types of expertise they typically use.19   
The third phenomenon contributing to the appeal of imposing a duty to 
vet experts, due in part to revelations of junk forensic science, is the 
tendency to idealize science and the “scientific method” as relatively 
uncomplicated sources of knowledge that could and should be used to 
stabilize the interpretive, rhetorical, social, and institutional instabilities of 
legal contexts.  However, such an idealization downplays or eclipses the 
interpretive, rhetorical, social, and institutional aspects of science itself.20  
As I will explain below, some of the proposals to require that lawyers vet 
experts seem to assume that assessing the reliability of an expert is simply a 
matter of checking one’s expert’s testimony against the presumably stable 
knowledge-base of the scientific establishment.  Or, in the case of certain 
types of forensic “science,” assessment is simply a matter of recognizing 
that there is no research validating their reliability. 
In the face of the convergence of these trends—prosecutorial 
misconduct, seemingly weak judicial control, and a romanticized vision of 
science for law—some obvious objections arise to my argument that an 
ethical duty to vet expertise is problematic because of both the complexity of 
reliability determinations and the role of an advocate. 
First, because a prosecutor’s role as a minister of justice is distinct from 
the roles of criminal defense counsel and civil advocates, an ethical rule for 
prosecutors to vet expertise would not affect the goals of advocacy.21  Thus, 
 18. Id. at 14, 36, 38.  That is, Edmond distinguishes between the prosecution and the defense (the 
“demonstrably reliable” requirement “should only apply . . . to evidence adduced by the 
prosecution”) . . . and between the criminal and civil litigation contexts (“plaintiffs, like criminal 
defendants, are not always in a position to produce demonstrably reliable evidence”).  Id. at 32–33. 
 19. Id. at 1–2. 
 20. See generally CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 10 (arguing that judicial failure to 
acknowledge the pragmatic aspects of science results in bad admissibility determinations, i.e., 
sometimes keeping out good science and sometimes allowing bad science into court). 
 21. See David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/367/.put.  
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my only argument against such a rule is that reliability determinations can be 
complex due to the uncertainties of science.  However, critics of the 
weaknesses of forensic science point out that some types of purported 
expertise are so easily discredited that a prosecutor should not introduce 
them (even if courts find them admissible).22  I agree, but there are several 
options to deal with that problem: 
(a) Because the current rule that allows attorneys to present evidence as 
long as it is not known to be false “reflects an adversarial paradigm,” 
Giannelli and McMunigal (and others) propose an ethical rule that “would 
bar a prosecutor from offering scientific evidence unless she knows it is 
sound.”23 
(b) Encourage judges to develop “the formal expectation that the 
prosecution can only adduce expert evidence if it is shown to be reliable.”24  
“If wrongful convictions across the common-law world have demonstrated 
anything, it is that liberal admissibility standards and judicial complacency 
have enabled prosecutors to use (and continue to rely upon) expert evidence 
that is not reliable.”25  Daubert was supposed to remedy such problems, but 
its “demanding standards . . . have yet to be fully implemented in criminal 
litigation.”26 
(c) Rely on the current ethical framework to police prosecutorial misuse 
of unreliable evidence—which does not seem to be working. 
Given the persistent problems of prosecutorial use of forensic science, it 
would be naïve to suggest that the solution is the already-established 
Daubert regime or the current ethical rules, which makes the establishment 
of a new ethical rule for prosecutors seem unavoidable.  Moreover, urgent 
concerns over fairness and justice in criminal law would seem to eclipse any 
theoretical concerns over the uncertainties of science that might make it 
difficult for prosecutors to know the soundness of their expertise.27  On the 
Prosecutors aren’t supposed to win at all costs.  In a time-honored formula, their job is to 
seek justice, not victory . . . .  [T]his stark difference between the prosecutor’s mission 
and the mission other advocates are assigned in the adversary system is obvious: the 
criminal justice system would be a travesty if a prosecutor, holding years of someone’s 
life in her hands, cared about nothing but notching another victory. 
Id. at 8–9. 
 22. See Giannelli & McMunigan, supra note 12, at 1493 n.1. 
 23. See id. at 1533, 1535; Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the 
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1439 (2007); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the 
Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2007). 
 24. See Edmond, supra note 15, at 30–31 (recommending that the Canadian Supreme Court 
explain “how indicia of reliability, like those from Daubert and elsewhere, should be weighted and 
applied”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 1531. 
 27. Giannelli and McMunigal are mildly critical of Professor Moriarty’s proposal that 
prosecutors not use evidence known (or which should be known) to be unreliable because “what is 
or is not reliable is subject to debate,” and it “would be difficult to fault a prosecutor who used 
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other hand, some types of expertise are more difficult to evaluate, such that a 
general ethical rule requiring prosecutors only to offer evidence that they know 
is sound could be difficult to enforce.  But the force of these objections—that 
prosecutors need policing, that much of the questionable forensic science is not 
that complicated, and that life and liberty are at stake—combine to make an 
exception (to my argument) for prosecutors reasonable, necessary, and well 
worth the risk that, in rare criminal cases (i.e., trials involving highly 
complicated expertise), the rule will be difficult to apply and enforce.  In any 
event, my argument in this Article is against imposing a general duty on all 
attorneys to vet their expertise. 
But there is another obvious objection to my argument, without regard for 
the need for an exception to address prosecutorial misuse of purportedly 
scientific evidence—namely, whether it really is an onerous burden on attorneys 
to confirm the reliability of their expertise.  I should emphasize that my 
argument is not based on any presumed inability of attorneys to understand 
complex science or on any notion of scientific illiteracy.  Rather, I want to 
emphasize the instabilities and uncertainties of expertise itself and base my 
argument on the phenomenon of serious disagreements among experts as to the 
reliability of certain scientific arguments.  While it is obviously necessary for 
judges and juries to make difficult evaluations, I balk at the notion that such 
evaluations should always be made in advance of the trial by advocates.  I say 
“always” because I recognize instances where attorneys should withhold 
frivolous evidence.  My argument is simply that we should not construct a 
general rule based on such examples.  Rather, we should hesitate to modify 
radically the advocate’s role, primarily because of the many counter-examples 
where the reliability of the science is not so easily discernable. 
In Section II below, I summarize the controversy over the ethical duties of a 
lawyer with respect to proffered expertise, including (i) the proposal requiring 
all attorneys to vet the reliability of their experts and (ii) the compelling 
argument for such a duty on the part of prosecutors in light of the crisis in 
criminal forensics.  I argue, in Section III, that the proposal for a general duty is 
based on uncomplicated hypotheticals and an oversimplified view of science.  In 
Section IV, I consider the implications of proposals to vet experts for the 
lawyer’s role as advocate.  I conclude, in Section V, that while numerous 
[weak] evidence carefully—that is, ensuring that the jury understood its limitations.”  Id. at 1535 
n.246.  Thus, they concede the controversy over “reliability” and impliedly the controversial nature 
of their own proposed rule.  In response to commentators who argue that the “principles and 
methods of science are often uncertain and in a state of flux,” they recognize the possibility that we 
may need a less demanding duty on prosecutors to only confirm that their expertise is based on facts 
and data, but not “the product of reliable principles and methods.”  Id. at 1536 n.248. 
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limitations on advocacy are justified, a broad duty to pre-judge the validity of 
proffered expertise is not. 
II.    DISCOURSES OF ADMISSIBILITY 
[T]o some extent the very nature of science can be characterized as 
uncertain, because scientific theories are either underdeterminative, 
or are never fully consistent with all the available evidence.  
Though the nature and degree of uncertainties may vary depending 
upon the given situation, . . . much of scientific research can be 
characterized as “uncertain” . . . . 
Stephanie Tai28 
 
In the scholarly discourse concerning health and environmental 
regulation, scientific uncertainty is a major theme—debates persist about 
whether the evidence to support a regulation is too uncertain or about 
acceptable levels of uncertainty.29  Inevitable uncertainties are, however, not 
so prominent in the scholarly discourse concerning scientific expertise in the 
courtroom.  Perhaps because regulation is prospective, and because a 
question about whether a particular chemical is harmful does not require a 
yes or no answer—“doubt may preclude a decision”30—the regulatory arena 
is unlike retrospective litigation where a decision about, for example, 
whether a workplace chemical caused harm is required.31  On the other 
hand, if a judge or jury does not find that such a tort plaintiff met his or her 
burden of proof, that decision is not necessarily a “no” answer—the 
chemical may have caused the harm, but the evidence was insufficient, or 
perhaps too uncertain, to support a verdict.32  And yet, in the post-Daubert 
era, characterized by judicial gatekeeping and concerns over “junk science” 
in the courtroom, decisions are made regularly (in so-called Daubert pre-
trial hearings or Frye hearings in those states that have not adopted Daubert 
standards) concerning the adequacy of proposed scientific experts and their 
 28. Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 676 (2009).  Scientific theories are 
considered underdetermined if there is a rival theory that is consistent with the evidence.  See 
generally RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 237–40 (1999) (describing how scientific 
communities put forth some theories “as true, correct, accepted, the best available, etc.” even though 
such theories are underdetermined). 
 29. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural 
Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007) (uncertainty is “the unifying hallmark” 
of environmental regulation). 
 30. Alyson Flourney, Legislation Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 327, 386–87 (1999). 
 31. See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 404 (Cal. 1999). 
 32. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 862 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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testimony.33  Such decisions involve a “yes” or “no” answer, and any 
substantial doubt on the part of the gatekeeping judge, perhaps due to 
substantial uncertainty in the science underlying the expert’s testimony, will 
lead to a “no.”34  Judges, unlike regulators, do not wait for more studies or 
for reductions of uncertainty levels before taking action. 
Despite the doubts raised in Daubert by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent35 
concerning the capacity of judges to make scientific judgments, they do and 
must in the post-Daubert gatekeeping regime.36  All the talk of “junk 
science” in the decades leading up to Daubert, together with the implied 
charge in Daubert to root out junk scientists from the courtroom, resulted in 
an unfortunate tendency to characterize scientific disagreements between 
two experts as the result of one of them being a charlatan and the other 
delivering scientific truth.  Moreover, despite the reference to “shaky” 
scientific evidence in Daubert,37 without the slightest suggestion that the 
attorneys proffering such evidence were unethical, the notion that lawyers 
have a duty to evaluate the validity of their proffered expertise has been 
lurking in post-Daubert scholarly discourse.38  The recent phenomenon of a 
crisis in forensic science has revived that notion, particularly with regard to a 
higher duty on the part of prosecutors to “voluntarily refrain from using 
potentially unreliable evidence.”39  Moreover, the image of any attorney 
proffering expert testimony that the attorney suspects is false is powerful, 
making the duty to stop such behavior appear common-sensical and 
rendering counter-intuitive the ethical rules that actually allow such evidence 
to be presented.  While there may be difficulties associated with evaluations 
of scientific reliability on the part of lawyers, the fact that judges do and 
must perform such evaluations gives a certain credence to the task.40  Thus, 
the difficulties of scientific evaluation have been eclipsed by debates over 
whether the ethical rules currently require attorneys to evaluate the 
reliability of their proffered expertise41 or whether ethical reforms are 
 33. See 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02[3] (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN]. 
 34. See generally id. 
 35. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) 
(doubting the capacity of trial judges to become amateur scientists). 
 36. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at § 702.02[3].  
 37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (referring to “shaky but admissible evidence,” appropriately 
attacked by “contrary evidence” or “[v]igorous cross-examination”). 
 38. See generally Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 421 (2001) (considering the question, “What are the legal and ethical 
responsibilities of attorneys when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?”). 
 39. Moriarty, supra note 23, at 24. 
 40. Id. at 23.  
 41. Id. 
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needed to establish such a requirement.42 
I hope to show that the trend toward greater ethical duties on the part of 
lawyers to “vet” their experts is based on an unrealistic view of the scientific 
enterprise and of the role of advocates.  While I agree that prosecutors have 
higher duties than lawyer-advocates in the fields of civil litigation and 
criminal defense, to say that the duties of every lawyer include, or should 
include, a duty to evaluate the scientific reliability of proffered expertise is 
more problematic that it seems. 
A. The Ongoing Debate 
A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not 
preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.   
Model Rules of Professional Conduct43 
 
The ethical rules regarding presentation of evidence are familiar: 
lawyers cannot present evidence known to be false and may refuse to offer 
evidence reasonably believed to be false—the latter aphorism confirms, 
indirectly, that evidence reasonably believed to be false can indeed be 
offered.44  At this point, the debate begins, and exceptions begin to develop.  
First, knowledge of falsity can be inferred from the circumstances.45  So, 
unlike the Virginia interpretation of the prohibition against knowingly 
presenting false testimony, which requires that the witness acknowledge the 
fraud46—perhaps a rarity—an attorney may be deemed to have actual 
knowledge of falsity—that is, second-guessed—when that falsity is obvious 
to everyone else.  Second, the belief, not knowledge, that evidence is false 
must be reasonable—if the lawyer has a very strong belief in falsity, 
whatever doubt there is may not qualify as “genuine and reasonable.”47  
Thus, a “strategic” belief in falsity may be transformed into actual 
knowledge.  Third, there is the suggestion that knowledge of falsity can be 
imputed if the lawyer should have known but for some reason claims not to 
have known of the falsity.48  Therefore, it is not really fair to attorneys to 
 42. See David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is there 
an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341 (2003). 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002). 
 44. Id. R. 3.3.  The indirect language persists in comment 8, which states that reasonable belief in 
falsity “does not preclude” presentation—the drafters refuse to say “It can be presented!”  
 45. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8 & R. 1.0(f).  
 46. Virginia Code Comm., Formal Op. 1650 (1995). 
 47. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK 
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.3:401 (2nd ed. Supp. 1992) (“If the lawyer’s 
uncertainty is genuine and reasonable, he can present the evidence without risk of violating Rule 
3.3.”). 
 48. See Caudill, supra note 42, at 344–48.  For example, in Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 F.2d 
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interpret the current rule as allowing attorneys to present all kinds of shaky 
evidence without regard to its potential falsity—it cannot be presented if the 
attorneys knows it is false or if a reasonable attorney would know it is false, 
or if the attorney’s doubts about its falsity are not genuine and reasonable.  
Professor Michael Saks, nearly a decade ago and in the context of a 
symposium focused on the problem of unreliable criminal forensics, argued 
in favor of an attorney’s duty to evaluate proffered scientific expertise; it 
appeared to Saks that under the current rule, “ignorance is bliss for both the 
proffered expert and the attorney . . . indeed the attorney would be rewarded 
for not going to the trouble to learn about the expertise.”49  This raises the 
possibility of a fourth exception, expressed as a duty of due diligence and 
reasonable inquiry when, for example, an attorney has doubts about the 
truthfulness of a client’s testimony.50  There is precedent for such a duty in 
cases involving the obligation to reveal client fraud on the court.51  But the 
question is whether a client’s false testimony (when the client knows the 
truth is otherwise, and the attorney could find the truth with some effort) is 
analogous to inadmissible scientific testimony.  For example, if a client in an 
immigration case proposed to testify that she came to the United States on a 
particular date, and her attorney doubts that the testimony is true, what 
ethical obligations arise?  If the attorney confronts the client who admits the 
testimony is not true, such that the attorney knows of the falsehood, then the 
testimony cannot be ethically presented; if a reasonable inquiry into the 
client’s file or governmental records could confirm the falsehood, then the 
attorney should have known or will be deemed to know of the falsehood, and 
the testimony likewise cannot be ethically presented.52  It is the assumed 
analogy between (i) confirming the falsehood in client files or governmental 
records and (ii) confirming the falsehood of the testimony of a scientific 
expert by a reasonable inquiry into “science” that supports the notion that 
expert testimony should not be presented if a reasonable inquiry into the 
1501 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated in part by 866 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1989), an expert testified 
contradictorily in two cases, and thus the expert’s counsel (the same attorney in both cases) “knew or 
should have known of the falsity of the testimony.”  750 F.2d at 1503.  In McNeill v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Tex. 1995), a railroad employee, who had won a 
verdict for permanent disability based on the testimony of medical experts, filed a discrimination 
action because his employer would not re-hire him; his attorney was deemed to have known about 
his obvious fraud.  878 F. Supp. at 990–91. 
 49. Saks, supra note 38, at 427.  I will return to and criticize this compelling argument and its 
obvious appeal in Section III of this Article.   
 50. See Virginia Code Comm., Formal Op. 1087 (1992). 
 51. See id.  Under the Virginia code, it is improper for attorney to take client’s representations at 
face value if, “in the exercise of due diligence upon reasonable inquiry . . . the attorney should know 
of information to the contrary.”  Id. 
 52. Id. 
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that
scientific literature would confirm its invalidity.  Again, in the context of a 
discussion about the lack of empirical support for many fields of forensic 
science, the analogy tends to work quite well. 
Saks’s argument at the symposium, therefore, seemed eminently 
reasonable: Attorneys should be “obligated to acquire a good faith basis for 
believing . . . that . . . proffered expertise is valid.”53  Validity, in the 
language of Daubert, is a requirement for admissibility and simply means, as 
Saks explained, that purportedly scientific evidence has a foundation in 
scientific methodology and data; it does not mean “true” or “correct” or that 
inconsistent expertise will not also be admissible.54  Model Rule 3.1 already 
requires that a “lawyer shall not . . . assert an issue [in a proceeding] unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,”55 and 
Comment 2 states that lawyers are to “inform themselves about the facts of 
their client’s cases . . . and determine that they can make good faith 
arguments in support of their client’s positions.”56  This current rule seems 
to support an obligation to vet experts.  However, an “action is not frivolous 
even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not 
prevail,”57 which means that Saks’s “good faith basis for believing” might 
be a stronger formulation.58  Indeed, Saks defined “good faith belief” as 
being able to (i) make a “well-grounded showing” that proffered evidence 
satisfies relevant admissibility (i.e., validity) criteria and (ii) “reach a 
considered judgment that it is valid and . . . make a sound case . . . that it 
ought to be admitted.”59  Here, Saks began to veer away from existing 
ethical guidelines, not with respect to the ability to make a well-grounded 
showing or a sound case in good faith, but with the “considered judg
 it is valid.”60 
Lawyers are currently permitted to proffer expertise that they reasonably 
believe is false, as long as they do not know it is false, because they “are not 
required to present an impartial exposition . . . or to vouch for the evidence 
submitted . . . .”61  Saks wanted lawyers to “defend [their expert’s] claims of 
validity to themselves,”62 phraseology which suggests that Saks did not 
simply mean admissibility when he used the term “valid;” in Saks’s 
example, handwriting examiners betray a “personal faith in the validity of 
what they do” even after “the field’s weaknesses [i.e., no valid scientific 
 
 53. Saks, supra note 38, at 426. 
 54. See id. at 422; infra note 79. 
 55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).  
. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
 note 38, at 426.  
9. 
CT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2002). 
s, supra note 38, at 429. 
 56. Id. R
 57. Id. 
 58. See Saks, supra
 59. Id. at 428–2
 60. Id. at 429.  
 61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDU
 62. See Sak
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basis] have been exposed and judged.”63  The handwriting examiner in 
Saks’s example presumably has faith in his field’s accuracy or correctness, 
not in its admissibility.64  For Saks, it was not difficult to “look below the 
surface” and see such testimony as “false or misleading.”65  Saks was not 
discussing “shaky” evidence that might be admissible, proffered in good 
faith by an attorney who doubts that it is true or even admissible; instead, he 
was discussing misleading testimony—handwriting expertise that has not 
been subjected to sufficient testing to establish its reliability.66  Even though 
a “lawyer should not conclude that testimony is . . . false unless there is a 
firm factual basis for doing so,”67 the “firm factual” basis was clear in 
Saks’s example.68  In short, while the conventional categories in the ethics 
of proffering expertise include (1) known falsity (unethical to proffer), (2) 
reasonable doubt about falsity (ethical to proffer), and (3) confidence in 
one’s expert (ethical to proffer),69 Saks’s example shifted the categories to 
(1) known falsity (unethical to proffer), (2) lazy failure to investigate 
validity (unethical to proffer), and (3) confidence in one’s exp
fer but irrelevant with respect to handwriting expertise).70 
I do not mean to downplay or minimize the frequency of examples like 
the one Saks used because many of the fields of forensic science have been 
shown to have little or no empirical support.71  Moreover, it does not seem 
fair to criticize Saks for proposing to somehow police the misuse of forensic 
“science” in criminal contexts,  which was clearly Saks’s focus (although he 
expanded his proposal to include, and offered an example from, the civil 
side of litigation).72  However, I fear the current focus on the weaknesses of 
many fields of criminal forensics tends to eclipse the problem
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 427 n.22, 428–29.   
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (2000). 
 68. See Saks, supra note 38, at 428–29. 
 69. See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.   
 70. See Saks, supra note 38, at 428–29; supra notes 53, 58–68 and accompanying text. 
 71. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 310, 313 (2006) (“[M]any 
forensic techniques achieved judicial acceptance before the demanding Daubert standards were 
operative.  Consequently, empirical support for many techniques is often lacking . . . .”). 
 72. See Sacks supra, note 38, at 427. 
 73. See, e.g., Edmond, supra note 15, at 33 (“[P]laintiffs, like criminal defendants, are not always 
in a position to produce demonstrably reliable expert evidence.  Plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation, for 
example, rarely have the foresight to sponsor prospective epidemiological studies before they 
become ill.”). 
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B. The Crisis in Criminal Forensics 
Even prior to the release of the National Academies of Science report on 
the weaknesses of forensic science in the criminal law context,74 ethical 
concerns had been raised regarding the obligations of prosecutors with 
respect to dishonest experts.75  Professor Myrna Raeder highlighted the 
question of “whether [a forensic] expert’s pattern of finding questionable 
results should put the prosecutor on notice of the likely falsity of the 
evidence,” and concluded that  
willful blindness should not provide an ethical pass.  However, I do 
not believe that the current language of the rules satisfactorily 
covers this type of misconduct.  Therefore, the rules or standards 
should be modified to provide that a clear pattern of inaccurate 
laboratory results is adequate to supply knowledge that the 
testimony in an individual case is likely to be false or misleading.76 
Professor Jane Moriarty, on the other hand, did find in the ethical rules a 
foundation for requiring that prosecutors, but not litigators on the civil side, 
vet their experts for reliability because of the unique responsibility 
prosecutors have as ministers of justice, not mere advocates.77  However, 
like Raeder, Moriarty saw a need for revisions to the rules to confirm a 
prosecutorial duty to present only reliable evidence.78  Recognizing the 
problem of defining “unreliability,” Moriarty suggests that the standard be 
“a factual basis to believe that the proposed evidence is incorrect, inaccurate, 
incomplete, misleading, substantially flawed, or without solid foundation.”79 
Despite the appeal of such proposals, the examples of weak forensic 
science seem to join with an assumption that the reliability of proffered 
scientific expertise is, with some effort, discoverable.  Using examples such 
as visual hair comparison or bite mark evidence, which are easily challenged 
as unreliable,80 the assumption can be justified.  However, reliability has 
 74. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) (calling into question the validity of many forensic 
science disciplines); Jules Epstein, The NAS Report: An Evidence Professor’s Perspective, IT’S 
EVIDENT, July 2009, http://www.ncstl.org/evident/July,%202009%20Epstein%20SPOTLIGHT (“[T]he 
Report’s findings call into question the degree of certainty testified to by practitioners of ‘soft’ forensic 
disciplines, the subjective pattern matching of fingerprints, ballistics, handwriting, tool marks, and 
tire and shoe print treads.  In particular, the Report found an across-the-board inability to validate 
claims that a correspondence of features between crime scene evidence and a known (e.g., between a 
latent print left at a burglary and the print of a suspect) proves that the suspect was the sole possible 
contributor.”). 
 75. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.  
 76. Raeder, supra note 23, at 1439. 
 77. See Moriarty, supra note 23, at 21–24. 
 78. Id. at 28. 
 79. Id. at 29. 
 80. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
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proven to be a significant problem in the post-Daubert debate over 
admissibility, and that problem should not be ignored.  
The problem regarding reliability is not simply that attorneys (usually) 
are not trained in science, because judges (usually) are not either. Judges 
need to make reliability determinations, so why not lawyers?  Rather, the 
problem is that the role of a judge is to evaluate reliability after hearing 
arguments from both sides in a pre-trial hearing.  The role of a lawyer, on 
the other hand, is to be a zealous and partisan advocate.  To require a 
decision on scientific correctness presumes that (1) such a decision is 
unproblematic (as it is in the context of many fields of forensic science) and 
(2) that such a decision is desirable for an advocate.  The first presumption 
involves a mistaken picture of science while the second involves a mistaken 
picture of law practice. 
III.    PICTURING SCIENCE 
Under current structures, where experts are chosen by the parties, 
efforts to impose an obligation on lawyers to do more to vet their 
experts seems both unwise and unrealistic. 
Joseph Sanders81 
 
In response to Michael Saks’s suggestion that an attorney should be 
ethically “obligated to acquire a good faith basis for believing . . . that [the] 
proffered expertise is valid,”82 Professor Joseph Sanders raised a compelling 
(even to Saks) and pragmatic concern: How would bad faith be determined 
without expending “substantial resources with limited returns beyond what 
can already be achieved through admissibility rulings”?83  By framing his 
objection in such terms, I think Sanders eclipsed another aspect of the 
problem with Saks’s proposal: What is “a good faith basis for believing” in 
the validity of one’s expert testimony in cases involving complex scientific 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 47–63, 67–71 (2009) (discussing hair comparison and bite 
mark analysis).  
 81. Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1564 (2007). 
 82. Saks, supra note 38, at 426. 
 83. Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563–64.  Saks, however, now agrees with Sanders that the ethical 
rule he proposed a decade ago would be unworkable because it would be both redundant (regarding 
Daubert) and pointless.  Email from Michael J. Saks, Professor of Law and Psychology, Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, to David S. Caudill, Professor and Arthur M. 
Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of Law (Aug. 1, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
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testimony?84   
Due to his focus on criminal forensics, Saks presumed that figuring out 
the scientific validity of an expert’s testimony is a fairly straightforward 
process, stating the following: 
Any attorney, like any intelligent citizen, who takes the time and 
effort to research a purported scientific subject has the potential to 
reach her own conclusions about whether or not the field’s beliefs 
rest on a foundation of data and logic that is solid, soft, mushy, or 
non-existent.  It is hard to think of principled reasons why an 
attorney should not be obligated to acquire a good faith basis for 
believing . . . that the proffered expertise is valid . . . as a 
precondition for ethically offering such expert evidence to a court.85 
In another formulation, Saks rhetorically asked: Does an “attorney have 
an obligation to first find out enough about the underlying science claims to 
have a good faith belief that what is being offered to the court is 
valid . . . ?”86  Relying on one’s expert’s assertions cannot be sufficient 
because, if it was, “lawyers could properly offer astrologers to courts.”87  
According to Saks,  
If what is ethically required is a reasonable good faith belief, it 
seems inescapable that the attorney could not use a shortcut or 
proxy test, but would have to at least ask herself: Do I know enough 
about this subject so that if it were challenged under Daubert I 
could make a well-grounded showing that, at least on current 
knowledge, it satisfies the relevant validity criteria?88 
Following Daubert, Saks conflated validity and admissibility in a Daubert 
hearing, implying that unless attorneys are required to reach “a considered 
judgment that [evidence] is valid and . . . can make a sound case to a court 
that it ought to be admitted,” then it would be ethical for lawyers to make 
“claims of validity to themselves or to courts with . . . the flimsiest of 
scientific support or none at all.”89 
 84. Regarding the question of when bad faith exists, Sanders, explicating Saks, offered the 
following example: 
[A] plaintiff’s treating physician [who] firmly believe[s] that his patient’s cancer was 
caused by the defendant’s chemical even in the face of a body of epidemiologic and 
animal study evidence indicating no relationship between exposure and this disease . . . .  
[O]n these facts an attorney would be acting in bad faith if he put the witness on the 
stand.   
Id. at 1563. 
 85. Saks, supra note 38, at 426. 
 86. Id. at 427. 
 87. Id. at 428. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 429.  In Daubert, validity is required for admissibility; “proposed testimony must be 
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My concern is that this proposition implies a picture of science where 
some amount of time and effort on the part of an attorney will result in an 
adequate judgment of validity. 
A. Background Controversies 
When agreement about what constitutes scientific knowledge can 
range so widely that even long-held ideas are challenged, it is not 
easy to come up with a workable alternative to the Frye [general 
acceptance] test, which requires the judge to be an arbiter of the 
views of practicing scientists.  Trying to decide which expert is 
reasoning properly seems a rather difficult task for a court, when 
even scientists often disagree on how to do it. 
Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger90 
 
The picture of science in which the proposal for an ethical obligation to 
vet experts is rooted was the subject of two controversies that arose in the 
wake of Daubert: (1) the question of whether Daubert really provided a 
reliability standard that supplanted Frye, and (2) whether Daubert should be 
recognized as having unwittingly established a particular cultural vision of 
science.   
As to the controversy concerning the Frye general acceptance test, the 
legal discourse immediately following Daubert emphasized that Daubert 
replaced Frye “with a new standard that places a premium on scientific 
validity and reliability.”91  That is, judges are required “to scrutinize 
scientific studies and evidence” and “to screen evidence for conformance to 
the scientific method and accepted scientific practice.”92  This framework 
supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”  Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).  There also must be a “valid scientific 
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility” because “scientific validity for 
one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”  Id. at 591–92.  
However, “there are no certainties in science,” as science “‘represents a process for proposing and 
refining theoretical explanations . . . subject to further testimony and refinement.’” Id. (quoting Brief 
for Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci. and Nat’l. Acad. Sci. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 7–8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (No. 92-102), 
1993 WL 13006281).  Therefore, validity is not truth or certainty, but “must be derived by the 
scientific method” to be reliable and admissible.  Id. 
 90. Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The 
Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 335 (2001). 
 91. Edward W. Kirson, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Active Judicial Scrutiny of 
Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J., no. 2, 1995 at 213, 213.  
 92. Id. 
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suggests that judges do not defer to the views generally accepted by 
scientists but instead stand in judgment over scientific experts, evaluating 
their testimony for its “reliability.”  However, as Paul Rice argued,  
The reality is that judges are compelled to return to the same 
relevant scientific communities for answers.  Daubert is little more 
than Frye in drag.  Judges simply retool Frye by anointing a single 
expert and substituting that expert’s opinions for those of the 
relevant scientific community.  The only difference is that the judge 
lays out the criticism and concerns of the expert as if they were the 
judge’s own . . . .93 
According to Gary Edmond, a Frye-type general acceptance standard was 
inevitable once Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael94 confirmed “the absence of 
universal features underlying the production of all forms of expertise.”95  
Proffers of expertise “have to be assessed against some meaningful standard.  
Presumably, . . . the field or discipline from which the expert originates will 
usually provide the appropriate indicators.  This means . . . the Daubert 
criteria . . . must always be applied via some version of the (general) 
‘acceptance’ test.”96  Rather than replacing acceptance with a reliability 
standard, reliability “is indexed to the specific standard of acceptance 
required.”97  Reliability, that is, 
will depend upon whether the jurisdiction requires near universal 
acceptance, general acceptance or the acceptance of a distinguished 
or substantial minority in a field.  All proffers of expertise, then, 
inescapably require some image of the field and some sense of the 
degree of acceptance, invariably linked to the requisite level of 
reliability.98 
Numerous other questions have been raised concerning how 
revolutionary Daubert really was, including the intense attention given to 
admissibility standards in the decades before Daubert,99 as well as the 
observation that admissibility determinations are often quite similar in Frye 
 93. Paul Rice, Truth in Test Tubes: Standard for Screening Scientific Evidence is Still Muddled 
Years After Daubert, LEGAL TIMES, Oct 16, 2000, at 85, available at 2000 WLNR 10521423. 
 94. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 95. Gary Edmond, Deflating Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael and the Inevitability of 
General Acceptance (Frye), 23 U.N.S.W. L.J., no. 1, 2000 at 38, 53 (discussing Kumho Tire). 
 96. Edmond, supra note 95, at 53–54. 
 97. Id. at 54. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: AN EXPLORATORY 
DISCUSSION (D. Nyhart ed., 1981) (proceedings of a 1977 conference anticipating the turn toward 
more active judicial gatekeeping with respect to expert scientific testimony). 
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and Daubert jurisdictions.100 
For my purposes, the notion that courts under Daubert do not defer to 
the scientific community is related to a vision of science as an accessible 
“catalog of truths” rather than “a contentious process.”  The former tends to 
demand “more of individual scientists and engineers than is expected of 
them in their own research and practice.”101  This vision can be called the 
“Science as Logical Reasoning” school of thought, identified by Beyea and 
Berger as comporting “with the popular concept of a scientist doggedly 
collecting irrefutable facts, step by step, and placing them in logical order.  
Lay judges are most likely to approach science with this ideal in mind, 
requiring scientists to make generalizations from observations or data to 
general laws of nature.”102  Scientific knowledge, according to this view, 
“exists as chunks of data bound together by logical propositions that can be 
identified objectively.”103   
By contrast, the “Science as Process” school of thought, associated with 
Popper and Kuhn, includes logic alongside “intuition, conjecture, inference, 
professional judgment, and repeated testing” as features of science.104  This 
view also acknowledges the subjective elements involved in each step of the 
production of scientific knowledge.105  Both schools of thought, however, 
find support in Daubert.  
Those who read Daubert as having institutionalized the view that 
science is characterized by logical reasoning can appeal either to scientific 
consensus as the marker of reliability or to the ease by which the 
characteristics of valid scientific knowledge and reasoning may be 
 100. See, e.g., Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 1579, 1580–81, 1619 (2003) (variation in treatment of scientific evidence “does not correlate 
with the adherence to Frye or Daubert admissibility standards”); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, 
Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 388, 
393 (finding that Frye is converging with Daubert and courts in Frye jurisdictions are beginning to 
scrutinize expert methodology and reasoning); see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH 
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCE LITIGATION 311 (1996) (“[P]ost-Daubert 
toxic substances decisions look very much like those that were decided before it, save for empty 
obeisance to Daubert.”). 
 101. See Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 328. 
 102. Id. at 330.  The authors associate this view of science with John von Neumann, who  
seemed to regard the empirical world, probably even life and mind, as comprehensible in 
terms of abstract formal structure. . . .  He seems to fall under that tradition of Western 
thought in which it is believed that only rigorous logic will ever succeed in containing the 
timeless, universal truths that govern everything.  
Id. at 330 n.15 (quoting STEVE J. HEIMS, JOHN VON NEUMANN AND NORBERT WIENER: FROM 
MATHEMATICS TO THE TECHNOLOGIES OF LIFE AND DEATH 129–30 (1980)).  
 103. Id. at 330. 
 104. See id. at 331–32.   
 105. See id. at 332. 
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grasped.106  However, consensus “on what constitutes scientific knowledge 
ranges from the near-universal to the hotly contested.”107  Moreover, 
“scientists can have vastly different opinions, even contradictory ones, and 
still be legitimate parts of the [complex] network [of interacting 
scientists] . . . .  Criticism of scientist by scientist is not uncommon . . . .  
When two scientists criticize each other in the courtroom, it does not mean 
that one must be wrong.”108 
Just as judges are operating under an idealized vision of science when 
they assume that disagreement among experts means one must be lying, I 
argue below that attorneys should not presume to pre-judge their own 
expertise in complex scientific disputes. 
B. Questionable Assumptions 
In [toxic tort] suits there is often considerable uncertainty, dispute, 
and controversy concerning the factual conclusions at issue.  In 
many cases . . . it may be unclear whether toxic substances cause 
cancer in human beings.  Thus, there may be no well-established 
consensus against which to measure the scientific validity of a 
particular legal judgment. 
Carl F. Cranor109 
 
The foregoing remark was a challenge to Bert Black’s selection of Wells 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,110 in which the verdict “ignored a well-
established scientific consensus,” to bolster his argument that courts should 
hold experts to scientific standards of evidence.111  Professor Carl Cranor 
notes that “the class of examples where a . . . decision . . . is contrary to 
widely held views in the scientific community is easily distinguishable from 
other cases in which the outcome depends upon a ‘battle of bona fide 
 106. See id. at 334; see also Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New 
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX L. REV. 715, 753 (1994). 
 107. Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 338.  Beyea and Berger are critical of Bert Black and his 
co-authors’ reliance on consensus because they give no “examples where there might not be a 
consensus.”  Id. at 334; see also Haack, supra note 10, at 10–11 (“[T]here are no rules determining 
when a scientific claim is well enough warranted by the evidence to be accepted . . . .”). 
 108. Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 338, 340.  The authors are critical of Bert Black and his 
co-authors’ view that “the characteristics of valid scientific knowledge and the kind of reasoning that 
produce it are not difficult to grasp.”  Id. at 335–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Black et al., supra note 106, at 753).  “If this is so easy, one wonders why the recognition of invalid 
science cannot be left up to juries.”  Id. at 336. 
 109. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW 62 (1993). 
 110. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir. 1986)  
 111. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 62 (discussing Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific 
Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 672–74 (1988)). 
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experts.’”112  Without regard to the debate over judicial admissibility 
standards, the tendency to select easy cases persists in recommendations for 
an ethical duty on the part of lawyers to vet their proffered expertise.  
Forensic science horror stories,113 and “the wave of DNA exonerations” 
where “forensic science has played a large part in those erroneous 
convictions,”114 offer compelling examples.  On the civil side, the example 
of proffering a physician who believes and testifies that a chemical caused 
cancer, “even in the face of [contrary] epidemiologic and animal study 
evidence,” can also be offered in the abstract as a case of unethical 
conduct.115  There seems to be an assumption that we, and the attorney, 
simply know that the physician’s testimony is wrong.  However, Cranor 
explains: 
Epidemiological studies . . . may provide the best evidence that [a] 
substance is carcinogenic . . . .  Whether they do . . . depends upon 
whether they suffer some possible practical and theoretical 
difficulties.  Practical evidence-gathering problems such as poor 
recordkeeping, job mobility (for work place studies), and exposure 
to more than one toxin may frustrate good studies.  And long 
latency periods for diseases typically caused by carcinogens make it 
difficult to conduct well-done, reliable studies.  [And] even if none 
of these problems exist, theoretical considerations indicate that in 
many circumstances the design and interpretation of such statistical 
studies . . . [create] the possibility that risks of concern may go 
undetected, because the power of the test may be quite low . . . .116 
Epidemiologists make trade-offs in terms of costs, sample sizes, 
avoidance of false positives, and relative risk; moreover, “the same trade-
offs may be forced in animal studies . . . .”117  None of which is to say that 
epidemiologic studies are unreliable, but only that there are limitations: 
“[M]ost studies have flaws.  Some flaws are inevitable given the limits of 
technology and resources.  In evaluating epidemiologic evidence, the key 
questions . . . are the extent to which a study’s flaws can be assessed and 
 112. Id.   
 113. See Raeder, supra note 23, at 1420–21 (“[P]rosecutors should be on the lookout for 
inaccurate or misleading testimony when offering an expert who presents statistics without scientific 
basis or relies on questionabl[e] . . . techniques, such as hair or bite mark analysis.”). 
 114. Saks, supra note 38, at 423  See generally Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 80. 
 115. See Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563. 
 116. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 29, 40. 
 117. Id. at 36. 
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taken into account in making inferences.”118 
That is why in the example above involving a physician claiming 
causation in the face of contrary epidemiologic and animal study evidence, a 
question arises as to whether the plaintiff’s attorney is ethically required to 
interpret that contrary evidence as conclusive.  If the example were to be 
modified to include numerous well-designed and powerful epidemiological, 
animal, and in vitro studies contradicting the plaintiff’s claim, such that the 
only evidence supporting the physician’s claim was temporal order, I would 
concede that plaintiff’s counsel should, even under current ethical rules, 
question whether there is a “basis in law and fact . . . that is not frivolous.”119 
Saks’s specific examples were a sincere physician willing to testify to 
causation when no grounds exist and an expert who is willing to testify to a 
fact that no scientist would accept.120  In those cases, Saks suggested, the 
attorney should “find out enough about the underlying science claims” to 
determine, or at least reach a good faith belief in, the validity of the expert’s 
testimony.121  That sounds reasonable, given the extreme hypotheticals and 
the current ethical framework requiring good faith arguments,122 but many 
cases will likely not be so easy—what if there are minimal or shaky grounds 
(i.e., not “no grounds,” but also not strong grounds) for the physician’s 
testimony, or what if the expert in the second example finds a few scientists 
who would accept his fact?123  An attorney faced with such an expert should, 
Saks seemingly suggested, do some research and make a decision on validity 
and admissibility in advance of the Daubert hearing or trial.124 
Steven Lubet, in answer to the question of when an attorney has “a 
reasonable belief as to the admissibility of evidence,” replies that such a 
“determination lies within the thought processes of the individual lawyer.”125  
That answer suggests that an ethical obligation to vet an expert would be 
unworkable, but the “good faith” standard in legal ethics, applied, for 
 118. Michael Green, D. Michael Freedman, & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 337 (2d ed. 2000). 
 119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002). 
 120. See Saks, supra note 38, at 427. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2002). 
 123. See, e.g., Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pennsylvania, Inc., 878 A.2d 509 (Me. 2005).  In 
Searles, the admission of a physician’s testimony (that plaintiffs’ respiratory problems were caused 
by volatile organic compounds [VOCs] from mold) was challenged because it was not supported by 
“peer-reviewed, scientifically verified, and generally accepted studies . . . .”  878 A.2d at 515.  The 
court noted, however, that  
[e]ven if the proposition that fungal VOCs can cause an irritant reaction of the type 
experienced by the [plaintiffs] has not gained general acceptance, Dr. Upham’s testimony 
and [several] journal articles . . . indicate that the proposition cannot be discounted as the 
marginal view of a handful of members of the relevant scientific community.  
Id. at 517–18. 
 124. See Saks, supra note 38, at 427.  
 125. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 295 (3d ed. 2004). 
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example, to the permission to make a good faith argument challenging 
existing law, is an objective standard—in other words, would a reasonable 
attorney have that belief?126 
At this point, the proposal to require attorneys to vet their proffered 
expertise becomes unworkable due to the nature of science.  One can 
imagine a disciplinary hearing wherein an attorney, who had proffered shaky 
scientific evidence, is accused of failing to attain a good faith belief in the 
validity of her expert’s testimony.  By framing his ethical concern in terms 
of validity, Saks’s proposal would mean that the evidence in the hearing will 
be scientific evidence, and one starts to sympathize with Sanders’ pragmatic 
concern that this enterprise would accomplish little more than an 
admissibility hearing already does (with the added feature that not only will 
an expert be rejected, but an ethical complaint against the proffering attorney 
may follow). 127  Indeed, Saks unwittingly imported all of the controversies 
over admissibility into the realm of ethics—appellate judges often disagree 
with trial judges about validity,128 and thus the question of whether the 
accused attorney’s belief was reasonable is not answerable by reference to a 
stable body of knowledge.  Scientific experts at trial also disagree, each side 
typically claiming to have followed the accepted scientific method.  Thus, to 
presume stability by simply consulting the scientific literature is also 
unrealistic.  The ethical rule only works if science is an uncontroversial 
field. 
In any event, the accused attorney would need to show a good faith 
belief in the validity, or likely admissibility, of her expert’s testimony, after 
familiarizing herself with the scientific literature in the field.  Other 
attorneys, and presumably scientists, could argue at the disciplinary hearing 
that no reasonable attorney, and no reasonable scientist, would have reached 
the same conclusion.  Saks offered the example of the handwriting expert in 
United States v. McVeigh,129 who was not proffered because the U.S. 
Attorney did not think that such expertise would be admitted under 
Daubert.130  Many scientific disputes, presumably, would be more 
complicated, and the potential arises, as Sanders warned, for Daubert 
hearings in disciplinary proceedings.   
Significantly, the ethical rules already prohibit attorneys from asserting 
 126. See Bach v. McNeils, 207 Cal. Rptr. 232, 246 (Ct. App. 1989) (a suit is meritless only 
“where any reasonable attorney would agree that the action is totally and completely without merit” 
(quoting Finnie v. Town of Tiburon, 244 Cal. Rptr. 581, 587 (Ct. App. 1988)).   
 127. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 128. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 10, at 15–47. 
 129. 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 130. Saks, supra note 38, at 428 (citing U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Trans.)). 
 698 
 
an “issue” in a “proceeding” “unless there is a basis in law and fact.”131  The 
disciplinary hearing described in the previous paragraph could therefore be 
framed as concerning a non-meritorious contention.  Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 
requires that lawyers “inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ 
cases,” which would certainly include the scientific facts in the testimony of 
expert witnesses.132  Of course, lawyers may offer evidence as long as it is 
not known to be false, but under Comment 8 to Rule 3.3, “A lawyer’s knowledge 
that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances.”133  I 
think this is really what proponents of a duty to vet expertise have in mind—
lawyers should not present false testimony, and they should take the time to 
figure out if their expertise is “false.”  Once everyone knows that the current 
technique of bite mark and hair analyses have no scientific basis and have 
led to erroneous convictions, it is wrong to present such testimony as valid.  
And the ethical rules already require a determination by a lawyer that “good 
faith arguments” can be made “in support of their clients’ positions.”134 
The problem is that many uses of scientific testimony are not so simple.  
Probabilities, uncertainties, conflicting theories that are both consistent with 
the evidence, debates in scientific literature, and dynamic changes in almost 
every field of science make it difficult for an attorney to identify, using 
Moriarty’s definition (for imposing a higher duty on prosecutors), testimony 
that is “incorrect, inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, substantially flawed, 
or without solid foundation.”135  Outside of forensic identification 
techniques, questions about the strengths or weaknesses of particular 
theories, data-collection techniques, and published studies become very 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002). 
 132. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
 133. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8. 
 134. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
 135. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Haack, supra note 10, at 9.  Haack 
suggests that, “[w]here all but the very simplest scientific claims and theories are concerned, the 
evidence will ramify in all directions; . . . it is almost invariably incomplete; and it is quite often 
ambiguous or misleading.”  Id.  at 9.  Moreover, when “the available evidence on some scientific 
question is seriously incomplete, [scientists] may reasonably disagree . . . .”  Id. at 10. 
As new evidence comes in, a consensus may eventually form . . . .  But there are no rules 
determining when a scientific claim is well enough warranted by the evidence to be 
accepted . . . . 
 Ideally, such consensus would form when . . . the evidence is sufficient; in practice, 
acceptance and warrant sometimes come apart.  This may be . . . the result of the 
influence or the persuasiveness of some individual or group in the field. 
Id. at 10–11.  Indeed, Haack remarks, “the law very often calls on those fields of science where the 
pressure of commercial interests is most severe.”  Id. at 15.  And, “[b]ecause the legal system aspires 
to resolve disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those 
for which all the evidence is not yet in.”  Id. at 16.  As to relying on peer-reviewed publications as a 
stable marker of reliability, Haack doubts “that many working scientists imagine that . . . publication 
after peer review is any guarantee that [a work] is good stuff, or that its not having been published 
necessarily undermines its value.”  Id. at 19.  Finally, “the core business of science is inquiry,” and it 
is “by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist.”  Id. at 12. 
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complicated.136  The lack of empirical support for bite mark and hair 
analyses could well change, making even the evaluation of those forensic 
identification techniques more complex and controversial, and in the field of 
toxic torts, current knowledge and scientific evidence will certainly 
change.137  The debates over low-dose toxicity provide a good example—
some scientists arguing that the risk is small; others arguing that the risk is 
large; and both sides basing their views on newer and better epidemiologic 
and animal studies.138 
C. Going Beyond the Easy Case(s) 
To be clear, Saks’s example of an easy case of inadmissible (or 
“invalid”) evidence assumed a physician with a sincere belief that “his 
patient’s cancer is caused by a chemical made by the defendant,” but where 
“no scientific research has ever been conducted.”139  The physician might 
think, “When it is conducted I am sure it will bear out my faith and my 
intuition.”140  Sanders, paraphrasing Saks, added to the hypothetical, 
presumably to make an even easier case, imagining that the physician is 
faced with “epidemiological and animal study evidence indicating no” 
causal relationship.141  In Saks’s hypothetical, the physician had no grounds 
from either “science” or “scientific literature” on which to base his sincere 
belief.142  Of course, if the physician was drawing on clinical experience, 
and perhaps a differential diagnosis, the example differs from one in which 
 136. See, e.g., Athina Tatsioni, Nikolaus G. Bonitsis, & John P.A. Ioannidis, Persistence of 
Contradicted Claims in the Literature, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2517, 2517 (2010) (“Some research 
findings that have received wide attention in the scientific community, as proven by high citation 
counts of the respective articles, are eventually contradicted by subsequent evidence.”); see also 
David Goodstein, Fed. Judicial Ctr., How Science Works, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 13 (2d ed., 2000) (distinguishing between textbook science and the frontiers of science 
(where theories are vulnerable)).  See generally Christopher Onslott, Judicial Notice and the Law’s 
“Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON L. REV. 465 (2007) (discussing the evolving nature of 
scientific knowledge).  
 137. See Carl F. Cranor, Do You Want to Bet Your Children’s Health on Post-Market Harm 
Principles? An Argument for a Trespass or Permission Model for Regulating Toxicants, 19 VILL. 
ENVTL. L. J. 251, 270, 311–12 (2008). 
 138. See generally id. at 270 (arguing that the risk of low-dose toxicity is great; however, “there 
are gaps in the science”). But see Michael Gough & Steven Milloy, The Case For Public Access to 
Federally Funded Research Data, POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 366, Feb 2, 2000, at 5–8, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa366.pdf (describing “panic” over endocrine disruptors and how the 
National Research Council “declared that the endocrine disruptor hypothesis was ‘rife with 
uncertainty’ and . . . without clinical or experimental support”). 
 139. Saks, supra note 38, at 427. 
 140. Id. at 427 n.21. 
 141. Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563. 
 142. Saks, supra note 38, at 427. 
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the physician has an intuition wholly unrelated to his clinical background.  
Because Saks seemed to be implying the latter, my only criticism is that he 
chose an extreme hypothetical to support a broad rule requiring lawyers to 
vet proffered expert testimony—how often do physicians selected to testify 
have no basis at all for their conclusion?  When the grounds for a 
physician’s testimony are merely weak (but not non-existent), the situation 
may be one “of strong scientific uncertainty—a phrase . . . [denoting] 
situations in which a qualified expert proposes to testify on an issue that hard 
science can resolve, but upon which substantial scientific study has yet to be 
done . . . .’143 
In those cases, it can be argued that a physician’s testimony (based on 
examination and the medical history of the plaintiff, the physician’s 
experience, and differential diagnosis) that exposure to a toxic substance 
caused the plaintiff’s injury, even in the absence of “rigorous scientific 
evidence,” should be admitted “when differential diagnosis has eliminated 
enough alternative causes to produce relevant and reliable conclusions.”144  
As to epidemiologic evidence indicating no causal relationship, 
Sanders’s addition to the easy case hypothetical, there is now a critical 
discourse on both the limitations of epidemiologic evidence and judicial 
handling of such evidence.  For example, Carl Cranor identifies the 
unfortunate possibility that “judges may take ‘no effect’ epidemiological 
studies at face value and conclude that [such studies demonstrate] that 
exposure does not cause the disease.”145 
If plaintiffs have offered some evidence of an effect based on other 
kinds of studies, simply because defendants have no evidence of an 
effect in particular epidemiological studies does not show there is 
evidence of no effect; it should not trump plaintiffs’ evidence.  
Defendants’ evidence could trump plaintiffs’ other evidence . . . 
only if . . . there was evidence of no effect from human studies and 
it . . . overwhelmed plaintiffs’ evidence . . . .  However, this is an 
extremely difficult showing to make.146 
Epidemiologist Sander Greenland shows how evidence of no causal 
relationship—the testimony of an epidemiologist “that exposure [to the 
 143. Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1467, 1468 (2000). 
 144. See id. at 1469, 1470 nn. 15 & 18, 1474.  The author proposes a framework by which “a trial 
judge might weigh the results of differential diagnosis, as well as the probative value of the temporal 
proximity between alleged cause and effect.”  Id. at 1470, see also id. at 1474–80 (describing the 
framework).  The framework is then applied to the Moore and Heller cases, concluding that the trial 
court was arguably wrong in Moore, but right in Heller, to disallow differential diagnosis testimony.  
See id. at 1481–84. 
 145. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 243. 
 146. Id. at 244–45. 
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chemical] does not pose a risk of the disease”—can be misleadingly 
constructed out of “no effect” studies.147  Greenland refers to the testimony 
of a cancer epidemiologist who explained to the court that risk evaluation 
under the scientific method always begins with the null hypothesis (no 
increased risk), and if no increase in the disease is observed, the null 
hypothesis is accepted.148  Greenland considers such testimony discredited 
and states that “[i]nstead of maintaining a hypothesis until forced to give it 
up, a good scientist should regard any hypothesis (including a null one) as 
conjectural, seek and welcome refuting evidence, and willingly abandon the 
hypothesis when faced with an alternative hypothesis that better explains or 
fits the evidence.”149 
Greenland then criticizes the expert’s strong assertion on the grounds of 
logic (“misrepresenting an expression of uncertainty . . . as support for a . . . 
certain assertion favoring the defense”150) and statistics (insignificance “of 
the null hypothesis leaves open the possibility that there are hypotheses more 
compatible with the data”151), as well as failure to address the validity of 
statistical assumptions, the cost of false negatives, and extant criticism of the 
expert’s viewpoint.152  Greenland concludes that experts should be 
encouraged “to give a moderated perspective that shows grades of 
confidence over the full range of possible effects” rather than to testify with 
pretended certainty.153 
Andrew Jurs similarly highlights the limitations associated with 
epidemiologic evidence in his study of judicial handling of complex 
scientific testimony.154  Jurs notes that the field of epidemiology not only 
lacks “consensus among researchers,” but that courts use “epidemiologic 
definitions beyond the scope of what researchers would do in the lab” and 
have trouble with their “statistical language of risks and probabilities.”155  
Moreover, by creating bright line rules, such as the doubling-of-the-risk 
 147. Sander Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and 
Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295 (2004). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. at 296. 
 150. See id. at 296–97 (“[L]ogically, ‘being uncertain’ not only means one cannot reject the [null] 
hypothesis . . . ; it also means one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is an effect.”). 
 151. See id. at 297–301. 
 152. See id. at 301–07. 
 153. Id. at 309–10. 
 154. See Andrew W. Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex and Cutting Edge Science in the Daubert 
Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 49 
(2009). 
 155. Id. at 70, 73, 75 (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
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approach,156 courts sacrifice “scientific validity at the altar of certainty . . . 
[covering] the uncertainty inherent in . . . epidemiologic analysis with a 
veneer of objectivity.”157  Finally, the “acceptance of epidemiologic relative 
risk as the sine qua non of causation in toxic torts is an example of the 
science within the courtroom clearly diverting away from the mainstream 
practice of science.”158  In Cranor’s assessment, “[I]t is simply a mistake to 
think that epidemiological studies are necessary for scientists to form 
reasonable views about toxic effects in humans.  Because of limited 
evidence, consensus scientific bodies in fact frequently utilize various kinds 
of nonepidemiological evidence in combination.”159 Well-designed 
epidemiological studies of sufficient duration, with large samples that are 
sufficiently sensitive, are the most direct evidence of human harm, but 
“various scientific problems, limitations, shortcomings, and weaknesses . . . 
affect their usefulness, especially in toxic tort suits.”160 
My point is simply to problematize the supposed easy case where it 
would be unethical to proffer the testimony of a physician in the face of 
contrary epidemiologic and animal evidence.  Of course, the hypothetical 
could be refined by making the epidemiologic evidence nearly bullet-proof 
and the physician’s testimony a mere hunch, but in a variation of Cranor’s 
argument that excellent evidence makes bad law because courts might 
expect that level of certainty in every case,161 extreme examples of unethical 
conduct may make bad ethical rules.  As a general rule, I do not agree with 
Saks that any attorney can, with some time and effort, reach a “good faith 
basis for believing . . . that . . . proffered expertise is valid . . . as a 
precondition for ethically offering” such evidence.162  If scientists only 
speak in terms of probability (degrees of certainty),163 and if the opposing 
experts in a case are credentialed scientists who disagree, why would a 
lawyer be so presumptuous?  Of course, a good faith belief in validity is not 
absolute certainty and could simply represent a belief in admissibility in a 
Daubert hearing.  In other words, an attorney should pre-judge admissibility 
before the judge has a chance to decide.  The problem is that an attorney 
may not know whether a proffered expert’s testimony is valid or invalid, or 
 156. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining 
that relative risk above 2.0, where the chance of illness from exposure exceeds the background 
chance of illness from all other causes, equals the “more likely than not” standard of preponderance 
of the evidence). 
 157. Jurs, supra note 154, at 76. 
 158. Id. at 79. 
 159. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 224–25. 
 160. Id. at 225. 
 161. Id. at 157.  Bendectin may be one of the best studied substances ever because “exposure 
information was quite good, the studies were comparatively quick to conduct, and large groups of 
exposed individuals were available.”  Id at 202. 
 162. See Saks, supra note 38, at 426.   
 163. See generally Jurs, supra note 154, at 76. 
[Vol. 38: 675, 2011] Lawyers Judging Experts 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
703 
 
ultimately admissible, and Saks seemed to be suggesting that such testimony 
should not be offered.  The next question is whether that perspective is 
consistent with the role of an advocate. 
 
IV.    THE LIMITS ON ADVOCACY, REVISITED 
A competent lawyer will shop for experts with views favorable to the 
lawyer’s case, and will attempt to deny use of unfavorable experts 
by the opposing side (e.g., by attempted disqualification in pre-trial 
maneuvers; by attempted impeachment in cross-examination; or by 
retaining, but not naming or using, unfavorable experts, thus 
denying them to the opposing side). 
Sander Greenland164 
 
That “anthropological” observation by an epidemiologist who is 
experienced in litigation165 provides a basis for the argument that attorneys 
should shoulder a large part of the blame for the perceived problem of junk 
science in the courtroom.  Indeed, in his recent proposal for “a new remedy 
for the misconduct of knowing proffer of inadmissible evidence,” namely 
allowing the opposing side to treat it as an admission of the weakness of 
one’s case, Professor Imwinkelried seeks harsher punishment for attorney 
misconduct.166  Imwinkelried did not discuss known proffers of inadmissible 
expert testimony, but he clearly views similar examples as wrongful.  
Edward Cheng, in response to Imwinkelried, notes that the notion of “clear 
inadmissibility” is “difficult to locate,” and Cheng would not identify 
proffers of technically inadmissible evidence with “perjury, fabrication, and 
spoliation.”167  Those who seek to impose a duty on attorneys to vet proffers 
of expert evidence seem to make the analogy between fabrication and 
proffers of inadmissible evidence, and to imagine that locating clear 
inadmissibility is not so difficult. 
The proposed duty to vet expert evidence is difficult to construct under 
the current Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 3.3 prohibits offering 
 164. Greenland, supra note 147, at 292. 
 165. Id. at 291. 
 166. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Poetic Justice in Punishing the Evidentiary Misdeed of Knowingly 
Proffering Inadmissible Evidence, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Issue 1, art. 6, 2009, at 1, 2, 
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss1/. 
 167. Edward K. Cheng, Response: Are Proffers of Inadmissible Evidence Wrongful?, 7 INT’L 
COMMENT. EVIDENCE, Issue 1, art. 6, 2009, at 1, 2, http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss1/art7/. 
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evidence known to be false; Comment 8 allows a lawyer to resolve doubts in 
favor of one’s clients, but it warns that “the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious 
falsehood.”168  Lawyers are allowed to offer testimony reasonably believed 
to be false and have an obligation to present their client’s case “with 
persuasive force,” but they do not vouch for submitted evidence.169  
However, these rules are all qualified by the duty of candor toward the 
tribunal and the warning that “the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be 
misled by . . . evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”170  At times, the 
assumption on the part of those who seek a general duty to vet expertise 
seems to be that the validity of scientific expertise is readily ascertainable, 
with some time and effort, such that any attorney is going to know, or should 
know, if the proffered evidence is false. 
Prosecutors do have a special duty not to mislead the tribunal,171 and 
ABA prosecutor standards, like the Model Rules for all attorneys, prohibit 
knowingly offering false evidence; the commentary warns that such falsity is 
known if it “reasonably should have been discovered by” the prosecutor.172  
Then the language changes from the Model Rules, because the “mere offer 
of known inadmissible evidence” is improper—Standard 3-5.6(b) prohibits 
knowingly offering inadmissible evidence.173  But because so much 
unreliable forensic science has been admitted in criminal trials, the argument 
for requiring prosecutors to vet their expertise for reliability is compelling.   
The current rules can be summarized as follows: no attorney may offer 
evidence known to be false; other than prosecutors, attorneys do not vouch 
for their evidence and may even present testimony reasonably believed to be 
false; and prosecutors have a higher duty to avoid offering evidence known 
to be inadmissible.  The proposal to require attorneys to vet their expertise 
would impose the prosecutors’ higher duty on all lawyers and would 
significantly alter the ability of lawyers to put on the best case possible for 
their clients—by avoiding known false evidence but otherwise proffering, at 
times, shaky evidence reasonably believed (but not known) to be false.  Just 
as the “duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict,”174  
the duty for all attorneys with respect to scientific expertise would be to seek 
scientific validity, not merely to advocate for one’s client.  Just as a 
prosecutor has a “quasi-judicial position” to ensure justice in our adversary 
system,175 so should all attorneys, the argument goes, with respect to 
 168. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002). 
 169. Id. R. 3.3 cmts. 2 & 8.  
 170. Id. R. 3.3. cmt. 2.  Rule 3.3 also notes that a lawyer may refer to other testimony reasonably 
believed to be false.  Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).  
 171. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10:27 (2d ed. 2008). 
 172. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION, 
Standard 3-5.6(a) cmt. (1993). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. Standard 3-1.2(c).  
 175. Id. Standard 3-1.2 cmt. 
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scientific expertise.  By contrast, under the Model Rules, “a lawyer can be a 
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that 
justice is being done.”176 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers offers an expanded 
rationale for the lawyer’s role as an advocate: “Advocates are guided 
primarily by the goal of advancing their individual clients’ interests . . . .  
They are expected to marshal evidence and legal argument in support of 
the positions of their respective clients . . . without personal 
responsibility for the outcome of the proceeding.”177 
This statement appears at the outset of the “Limits on Advocacy” 
topic, where the prohibition against frivolous advocacy, the duty to 
disclose adverse legal authority, and the special rules of candor in ex 
parte proceedings are also discussed.178  Other limits on advocacy 
discussed in the Restatement include compliance with law and limitations 
on being a witness and on public comments, as well as the prohibition 
against presenting false testimony or evidence.179  Indeed, there are so 
many limits on advocacy (e.g., prohibitions against influencing or 
insulting a judge, contact with jurors, or destroying evidence)180 that 
another limitation on advocacy does not seem startling.  However, if the 
concern over lawyers introducing inadmissible or invalid scientific 
evidence is a concern that the lawsuit is frivolous, that concern is already 
addressed by the ethical rules.  Beyond that, the suggestion that lawyers 
should make a personal assessment of the validity of their expert’s 
testimony seems to conflict with the advocate’s role.  Lawyers are not 
permitted, for example, to state their personal opinions about the justness 
of a cause or credibility of a witness,181 but they are allowed to “argue 
any position or conclusion adequately supported by [their] analysis of the 
evidence.”182  The latter freedom comes with the “adequately supported” 
limitation, but the Restatement’s commentary on the former limitation 
notes that the rule 
 176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Pmbl. 8 (2002). 
 177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch.7, topic 2, intro. note (2000).  
 178. See id. §§ 110–12. 
 179. See id. §§ 105, 108–09, 120. 
 180. See id. §§ 113–15, 118. 
 181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107 (2000). 
 182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(1) (2000).  This rule could 
be read as a duty to vet experts because if the evidence proffered must support a lawyer’s argument, 
then the evidence must also be valid.  Such a reading, however, would be in conflict with the 
freedom to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes, but does not know, is false. 
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is designed to prevent interjection of the lawyer’s own credibility 
into the issues to be decided . . . .  The rule also preserves the 
advocate’s role as an independent professional agent.  Permitting 
advocates to make personal affirmations would by implication 
disparage the causes of a client for whom the chosen advocate 
could not conscientiously vouch, prejudicing the rights of those 
with unpopular or difficult cases.183 
When you get to the rule against presenting false evidence, a “lawyer 
should not conclude that testimony is or will be false unless there is a 
firm factual basis for doing so.”184  This is the opposite of the proposal to 
require vetting of experts. 
While the adversary system, wherein parties are responsible for and 
in control of collecting and presenting evidence,185 is not without its 
critics,186 
the [traditional] reason for this arrangement lies in the belief that 
each party, driven by self-interest and desire to win, will do the 
best job of finding evidence and forming arguments in his favor.  
[This implies that] each party is only responsible for his own 
case and does not have the obligation to offer evidence or 
advance arguments in favor of his opponent.187 
Lon Fuller famously described the importance and distinction in the 
adversary system of the roles of the judge and jury (who are excluded 
from partisanship), as opposed to the advocate’s role—“[h]is task is not 
to decide but to persuade”; his (or her) viewpoint is not detached but 
rather “from that corner of life into whom fate has cast his client.”188  
Arguments for each party “must be presented . . . with partisan zeal by 
one not subject to the restraints of the judicial office.”189  In another 
formulation: 
 183. Id. § 107(1) cmt. b. 
 184. Id. § 120 cmt. c. 
 185. See KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 7 (2003). 
 186. See STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH 
TO ADJUDICATION 51–67 (1988); see also HUANG, supra note 185, at 7–8 (the system is premised 
on both sides having the same resources, which may not be true); id. at 17 (risk of attorney 
manipulation of truth). 
 187. HUANG, supra note 185, at 7. 
 188. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 36 (Harold J. Berman 
ed., 1973); see also DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 3 (2008) (“Unlike juries and judges, adversary lawyers should not pursue a true 
account of the facts of a case and promote a dispassionate application of law to these facts.  Instead, 
they should try aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients’ purposes.  
This requires lawyers to promote beliefs in others that they themselves (properly) reject as false.  
Lawyers might, for example . . . make legal arguments that they would reject as judges.”). 
 189. Id.  
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The adversary process assigns each participant a single function.  
The judge is to serve as a neutral and passive arbiter.  Counsel 
are to act as zealous advocate . . . .  Each knows what is expected 
of them . . . .  Among the greatest dangers . . . [is] that the 
attorney will compromise his client’s interests if compelled to 
serve as an officer of the court rather than as an advocate.190 
Failure to carry out that duty both impedes development of the case and 
undermines the adversary process.  The proposal for an ethical obligation to 
vet expertise therefore represents a substantial shift in the attorney’s role 
with respect to proffered expertise, from zealous advocate to a kind of 
neutral, court-appointed scientific expert. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
The reason that the proponents of the duty to vet expertise do not see 
their proposal as a wholesale challenge to the lawyer-as-advocate model is 
that, with respect to scientific expertise, they have simply eliminated the 
category of evidence “reasonably believed to be false.”191  If one wonders 
whether an expert’s views are false, one should do the research necessary to 
conclude either that it is false or that it is valid and therefore admissible.  
This puts attorneys in the position of judging the validity of expertise, 
although one need only reach a good faith belief in validity, not absolute 
certainty.192  But if Greenland is correct that “acknowledgement of 
controversy and uncertainty is a hallmark of good science,”193 this is not 
always easy. 
The real problem with the proposed duty to vet expertise is the 
proposition that attorneys should come to a good faith belief in validity.  
What if I am uncertain, that is, I am not really sure if my expert physician’s 
opinion or the other side’s epidemiologic evidence is correct?  Is that 
uncertainty a failure to come to a good faith belief in validity or a justifiable 
uncertainty arising out of a scientific controversy?  One could tell me to go 
back to the literature to settle the controversy.  But the attorney’s role as an 
advocate, notwithstanding its limitations in terms of duties of candor to the 
court, should remain particularly distinct from the judge’s and jury’s role in 
resolving such disputes.  When Saks said that it “is hard to think of 
principled reasons why an attorney should not be obligated to acquire a good 
 190. LANDSMAN, supra note 186, at 35. 
 191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002).  
 192. See Saks, supra note 38, at 428. 
 193. Greenland, supra note 147, at 294. 
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faith basis for believing” that proffered expertise is valid,194 the reasons that 
he missed were the complexity of a lot of courtroom expertise and the 
advocate’s traditional role in our adversary system. 
 
 194. Saks, supra note 38, at 426. 
